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COMMENTS

IT IS A “WAR ON DRUGS” AND IT IS TIME TO RELOAD OUR
WEAPONS: AN INTERPRETATION OF 21 U.S.C. § 841

One of the slogans of the post-Mao reforms in China was, “Any cat is a good
cat if it catches mice.” Well, any drug policy is a good drug policy if it
reduces the total damage that drugs do. And we ought to start looking for
policies that work rather than policies that fits [sic] somebody’s ideological
preconceptions.1
[I]t’s part of a long running battle in this country between tolerance and
intolerance. And we go through periods of respecting diversity and we go
through periods of doing everything we can to enforce conformity. And I
think that’s really where the war on marijuana and the war on drugs, in
particular, seem so important.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

When a defendant is sentenced as a drug offender under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the quantity and classification of the
drug possessed by or attributed to him will largely determine his sentence.3

1. See Frontline: Busted-America’s War on Marijuana (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 28,
1998) (interview with Mark Kleiman, Professor at the School of Public Policy and Social
Research University of California-Los Angeles (Winter 1997-98)). See generally Frontline:
Busted–America’s
War
on
Marijuana
(visited
Aug.
22,
1999)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgph/pages/frontline/shows/dope/interviews/kleiman.html>.
2. See Frontline: Busted-America’s War on Marijuana (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 28,
1998) (interview with Eric Schlosser (Dec. 1997)). See generally Frontline: Busted–America’s
War
on
Marijuana
(visited
Aug.
22,
1999)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgph/pages/frontline/shows/dope/interviews/kleiman.html>.
3. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, at § 2D1.1 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
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Since quantity is so crucial to determining the appropriate sentence, it seems
rational that the method for determining quantity should be both thoroughly
explained and uniformly applied. Unfortunately, this is not the case for
determining what constitutes a marijuana “plant” under 21 U.S.C. § 841.4
Imagine the following scenario: You have been in possession of 827
marijuana plants in pre-harvest condition and 288 marijuana stalks.5 The
stalks had no leaves on them, thus leaving only dry husks.6 Furthermore, you
have been charged and convicted for conspiring to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841, and
are to be sentenced accordingly.7 If you are fortunate enough to be tried in the
Second or Sixth Circuit, you will be sentenced to sixty-three to seventy-eight
months in prison.8 Tried in any other circuit, you will be sentenced to a

4. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970). 21 U.S.C. § 841 reads as follows:
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally—
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance; or
to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
counterfeit substance.
(b) Penalties
Except as otherwise provided in section 859, 860, or 861 of this title, and person who
violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows. . .
(1)(A)(vii) 1000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants regardless of weight. . .
[S]uch person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10
years or more than life. . .No person sentenced under this subparagraph shall be eligible
for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed therein.
In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section—
(v)(ii) 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, or 100 or more marijuana plants regardless of weight. . .
[S]uch person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which
may not be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years. . .
(c) In the case of less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, except in the case of 50 or more
marijuana plants regardless of weight. . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not more than 5 years. . .
Id.
5. See United States v. Fitch, 137 F.3d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1998). A marijuana stalk is
the remains of a previously harvested marijuana plant. Id. at 279.
6. Id. at 279.
7. Id. at 279-80. The hypothetical represents the facts in Fitch.
8. Id. at 278. The hypothetical assumes that the 288 stalks seized are not considered
marijuana plants under 21 U.S.C. § 841. The hypothetical also assumes that when sentenced
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, that there is a base level of twenty-six and a
criminal history of I. Thus, making the sentencing range from 63 to 78 months.
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minimum of ten years in prison.9 The cause for the discrepancy between
sentences is attributable to the way each circuit interprets the term “plants”
under 21 U.S.C. § 841.10 While finding a definition for “plant” may not seem
anymore difficult than consulting a dictionary, doing so has resulted in
inconsistent decisions among the circuits.11 Varied sentencing values,
preconceptions among individual district judges, and the unlimited discretion
to fashion sentences according to the judge’s own sense of what constitutes
just and effective sentencing has resulted in a wide disparity in sentencing
penalties.12
This sentencing disparity caused Congress to enact the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (“SRA”).13 At that time, the SRA was “the most far-reaching
reform of federal sentencing in the country’s history.”14 The SRA created the
United States Sentencing Commission and gave it the authority to refine and
develop guidelines for sentencing in the federal courts.15 The purpose behind
the SRA was to provide fairness and certainty at sentencing, and to reduce

9. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). The hypothetical assumes that the 288 stalks seized
are considered marijuana plants for the purpose of sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841; therefore
requiring the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.
10. See Fitch, 137 F.3d at 279; United States v. Stevens, 25 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. See Fitch, 137 F.3d at 279; United States v. Stevens, 25 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992).
12. See generally Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 4-9
(1972) (describing the considerable discretion that judges exercise in sentencing and the resulting
predominance of judges’ personal beliefs in sentencing decision making). As Judge Frankel
explained:
The factual basis for the worry [about sentencing disparity] is clear and huge; nobody
doubts that essentially similar people in large numbers receive widely divergent sentences
for essentially similar or identical crimes. The causes of the problem are equally clear:
judges vary widely in their explicit views and “principles” affecting sentencing; they vary,
too, in the accidents of birth and biography generating the guilts, the fears, and the rages
that affect almost all of us at times in ways we often cannot know. . . . It is disturbing
enough that a charged encounter like the sentencing proceeding, while it is the gravest of
legal matters, should turn so arbitrarily upon the variegated passions and prejudices of
individual judges.
Id. at 7-8.
13. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 54, 56 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224-29.
14. Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on
Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 305 (1993). See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 99 Stat. 1837 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990) (stating that the SRA is
“the most broad reaching reform of federal sentencing in this century”).
15. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 63-65 (discussing the Committee’s composition and
authority).
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disparity in sentencing penalties.16 The Guidelines established specific criteria
so that similarly situated defendants convicted of similar offenses would be
sentenced uniformly across the circuits.17 In further effort to end the disparity,
the Guidelines only allowed sentences to vary the greatest of twenty-five
percent or six months.18 Consequently, the Guidelines drastically stripped
federal court judges of their discretion.19
Nevertheless, the SRA was only one piece of a larger scheme designed to
improve the federal criminal laws.20 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 (“1984 Crime Act”) was also enacted.21 Congress enacted the 1984
Crime Act in response to the rise in crime, specifically the dramatic increase in
the drug arena.22 The 1984 Crime Act imposed mandatory minimum sentences
specifically designed to deter drug-related and violent crimes.23
Drug crimes still continued to escalate.24 In response, Congress enacted
tougher statutory mandatory minimum penalties.25 These penalties came in the
form of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198626 and the Omnibus Anti-Drug Act of
1988.27 Incompatibility between the Guidelines, under the SRA, and the

16. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65. The Senate Committee characterized the “primary goal of
sentencing reform” to be the reduction of disparity among similarly situated defendants. Id.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1988).
18. Id. § 994(b)(2). Congress provided:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum
of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by
more than the greater of 25% or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range
is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
Id.
19. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1984) (stating that “[t]he purpose of the sentencing
guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and the appropriateness of the
sentence for an individual offender”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52-53 (1984) (the Guidelines should
also “enhance the individualization of sentences by imposing on judges a structure for evaluating
the fairness of particular sentences in the light of individual case characteristics”).
20. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1987)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter 1984 Crime
Act].
21. See id.
22. See Tracy Thompson, Drug-Case Avalanche Buries Federal Courts, WASH. POST, Dec.
24, 1990, at A1. Since 1980, the number of drug cases in the federal courts has jumped 300%.
Id.
23. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986);
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
24. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
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minimum statutory penalties, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, caused a lack of
uniformity among drug sentencing cases in the federal courts.28
This comment analyzes the question of whether dead marijuana stalks
qualify as “plants” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). Part II of this
comment describes the evolution of the sentencing of drug offenders in the
United States,29 and briefly explains how the Guidelines operate.30 This
section also discusses how the SRA functions in relationship to 21 U.S.C. §
841.31 Part III outlines the botanical definition, cultivation, and historical
background of marijuana.32 Part IV describes the circuits’ different approaches
in interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 841.33 Part V contains the author’s analysis of the
statute.34 The Comment concludes by offering a solution to achieve uniformity
in sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and to fight the “war on drugs.”35
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SENTENCING FOR DRUGS
A.

The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970

Since 1914, Congress had enacted various laws pertaining to drug
importation and distribution,36 but none of these laws were successful in either
reducing the amount of drugs entering the country or lowering the number of
drug offenders.37 Until 1970, the United States was virtually without any clear
drug sentencing policy.38 In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“1970 Drug Act”) authorizing the
enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 841.39
28. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM iv, 3, 118-24
(1991).
29. See infra notes 37-97 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 105-41 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 142-90 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 191-253 and accompanying text.
35. See discussion infra Parts VI and VII.
36. See, e.g., Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, ch. 1, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(codified as part of 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1994) (previously codified as I.R.C. §§ 4701-76
(1964)); Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937); Narcotic
Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956).
37. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), hereinafter 1970 Drug Act reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4550,
4571. According to legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, Congress had previously enacted over fifty pieces of legislation attempting to stop
illegal drug trafficking. Id.
38. See Douglas J. Quivey, Note, Market-Oriented Approach to Determining Drug Quantity
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 653, 658 (1993).
39. 1970 Drug Act, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4566.
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The 1970 Drug Act was a thorough overhaul of existing federal drug
control law.40 In the 1970 Drug Act, Congress adopted a flexible system of
indeterminate sentencing due to the 1956 Narcotic Control Act’s41 strict
mandatory sentences failure to reduce the number of drug offenses.42 In 1970,
it appeared that rehabilitation rather than retribution was the philosophy and
purpose of imprisonment. The 1970 Drug Act included the repeal of statutory
mandatory sentencing provisions for drug offenses43 giving trial judges almost
complete discretion in determining sentences for drug violations.44 The
purpose behind giving judges such freedom was to allow judges to tailor fit a
sentence to the offender rather than just to the offense.45
B.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

The continuous rise of crime in the United States caused the criminal
justice system to focus less on rehabilitation and more on sentencing.46 Critics
of the rehabilitative model argued that it was ineffective and unrealistic.47 The
high frequency of parole created the perception of a penal system akin to that
of a “revolving-door.”48 The availability of parole, which frequently resulted in
significant reductions in the amount of time actually served, seemed to make a
mockery of the sentences imposed by judges.49 Still, many often criticized that
the federal system allowed for broad discrimination and disparity in
sentencing.50
In response to the increasing criticism, Congress enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.51 The SRA established four goals for a federal
sentencing system:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

40. See id.
41. See Narcotic Control Act.
42. 1970 Drug Act, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4570.
43. See id.
44. See Edward J. Tafe, Comment, Sentencing Drug Offenders in Federal Courts: Disparity
and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 369, 377 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Wilkins, supra note 14, at 308.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 305.
49. Id. at 309.
50. Id. at 308.
51. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 99 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). On October 12, 1984, President
Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Act of 1984 making the Sentencing Reform Act a law.
Id. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding both the sentencing
guidelines and the commission constitutional).
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defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.52

By abandoning the rehabilitation model and adopting a more retributivist
position on sentencing, the SRA reflected the attitude change in the country.
In an attempt to achieve the goals of the SRA, Congress established the
United States Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”).53 The
Sentencing Commission was to author a uniform system that would generate
fair sentences and sharply curtail the unwarranted disparity in federal
sentencing.54 The sentences were to be known as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.55
The Guidelines became effective in November, 1987.56 The direct goals of
the Guidelines were honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. 57
Under the SRA, a court’s decisions were to be based on “the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense
committed by the applicable category of defendant” as set forth in the
Guidelines.58 In essence, the Guidelines use a matrix, referred to as the
Sentencing Table. The Sentencing Table consists of forty-three offense levels
and six criminal history categories used to identify the sentencing range
applicable to a defendant.59 Also included in the Guidelines are provisions for
mandatory minimum sentences in relation to the substantive drug laws.60

52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(A)-(D) (1994).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). The SRA called for the President to appoint an expert,
seven-member full-time commission to create sentencing guidelines that would effectively and
rationally channel the discretion of the federal courts. The Commission was established within
the judiciary branch. See § 991(b)(1)-(2).
54. See Lisa Anne Bongiovi, Criminal Law-Sifting Through the “Mixture” Problem to
Determine a Drug Offender’s Sentence, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 400 (1993).
55. Id.
56. See Tafe, supra note 45, at 372.
57. See Bongiovi, supra note 55, at 400.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (1988). The court must review the following seven factors
before imposing a sentence:
(1)
the nature and the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
defendant’s history and characteristics;
(2)
the need for the sentencing to match the offense and the purposes of
imposing a sentence;
(3)
the type of sentences available under relevant statutes;
(4)
the type of range for sentencing established by the Guidelines;
(5)
any relevant policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(6)
the need to not have sentence disparity for similar situations;
(7)
and the need to provide restitution to the offenses’ victims.
Id.
59. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5A.
60. See id. § 5G1.1.
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Under the SRA, the applicable sentencing range is derived from an
intersection of the defendant’s “Total Offense Level” and “Criminal History
Category” on the Sentencing Table.61
The offense level is represented by the vertical axis of the Sentencing
Table.62 To determine the offense level, the judge selects the applicable base
offense level, which is derived from the offense of conviction.63 The
defendant’s base level is found by referring to the Guidelines’ Drug Quantity
Table.64 The table bases the level on the quantity and type of drugs involved.65
61. Id. § 5A.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 2D1.1(c). Following the drug quantity table is a provision
that explains how to treat marijuana plants for sentencing purposes. On November 1, 1995, the
Commission amended the footnote to the Drug Quantity Table to read as follows:
In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, treat each plant, regardless of sex, as
equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. Provided, however, that if the actual weight of the
marihuana is greater, use the actual weight of the marihuana.
The amendment states:
For marihuana plants, the Commission has adopted an equivalency of 100 grams per
plant, or the actual weight of the usable marihuana, whichever is greater. The decision to
treat each plant as equal to 100 grams is premised on the fact that the average yield from a
mature marihuana plant equals 100 grams of marihuana.
The Commission gave the following justification for the amendment:
For offenses involving 50 or more marihuana plants, the existing § 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking; Attempt or Conspiracy) uses an
equivalency of one plant = one kilogram of marihuana, reflecting the quantities associated
with the five- and ten-year mandatory minimum penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841. For
offenses involving fewer than 50 marihuana plants, the guidelines use an equivalency of
one plant = 100 grams of marihuana, unless the weight of the actual marihuana is greater.
In actuality, a marihuana plant does not produce a yield of one kilogram of marihuana.
The one plant = 100 grams of marihuana equivalency used by the Commission for
offenses involving fewer than 50 marihuana plants was selected as a reasonable
approximation of the actual average yield of marihuana plants taking into account (1)
studies reporting the actual yield of marihuana plants (37.5 to 412 grams depending on
growing conditions); (2) that all plants regardless of size are counted for guideline
purposes while, in actuality, not all plants will produce useable marihuana (e.g., some
plants may die of disease before maturity, and when plants are grown outdoors some
plants may be consumed by animals); and (3) that male plants, which are counted for
guideline purposes, are frequently culled because they do not produce the same quality of
marihuana as do female plants. To enhance fairness and consistency, this amendment
adopts the equivalency of 100 grams per marihuana plant for all guideline determinations.
Prior to the amendment the provision stated:
In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, if the offense involved (A) 50 or
more marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 1 KG of marihuana; (B) fewer
than 50 marihuana plants, treat each plant as equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. Provided,
however, that if the actual weight of the marihuana is greater, use the actual weight of the
marihuana.
Id.
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The judge then adjusts the base offense level in the light of various indicators
of the real offense conduct.66
The criminal history category is represented by the horizontal axis of the
Sentencing Table.67 This category is based on the number and length of the
defendant’s sentences for prior convictions.68 Then, the intersection of the
total offense level and criminal history category on the Sentencing Table are
used to determine the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.69
Ultimately, the sentencing judge must impose a sentence from the range unless
aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present and the presence of such
circumstances warrants a sentence outside the Guidelines’ range.70
Particular provisions of the Guidelines have evolved substantially since
their initial promulgation. Since 1987, the Commission has adopted over 500
amendments; although, the fundamental structure of the Guidelines has
remained constant.71 Still, many commentators had a negative reaction to such

65.
66.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

See id.
See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 3. The judge may allow adjustments related to:
the harm to the victim;
the defendant’s role in the offense;
whether there has been any obstruction of justice;
whether the defendant was convicted of multiple counts; and
whether the defendant has accepted personal responsibility for the offense.

Id.
67. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5A.
68. Id. The criminal history portion of the Sentencing Table has six categories, each
covering a range of two to three criminal history points. Id.
69. Id. The range is stated in terms of months of imprisonment. Id.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The guidelines state the following:
Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose a sentence of
the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining
whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider
only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court
shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in
subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an
offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship
of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar
offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission.
Id.
71. See id.
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mandatory sentences.72 Commentators argue mandatory minimum sentences
prevent federal judges from exercising discretion, therefore not allowing for
human compassion.73
C. The Controlled Dangerous Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984
In addition to the SRA, a chapter in the 1984 Crime Act is the Controlled
Dangerous Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984.74 The 1984 Crime
Act reintroduced mandatory minimum sentence drug law.75 The 1984 Crime
Act was designed “to provide a more rational penalty structure for the major
drug trafficking offenses” by making punishment dependant upon the quantity
of the controlled substance.76 Instead of operating under the theory of whether
drugs were narcotic or non-narcotic, the 1984 Act operated on the notion that
unjustified sentencing disparity could be reduced by basing sentences on the
pure weight and type of drug involved.77
D. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
While Congress was finishing the 1984 Crime Act, problems associated
with drug abuse gained increasing national attention.78 Congress, frustrated by
the startling increase of the flow of drugs into the country, sought a broad
solution to stop both the supply and the demand of drugs.79 Furthermore,
Congress believed that because sentencing practices were lenient, drug

72. See Frontline: Busted-America’s War on Marijuana (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 28,
1998) (interview with Judge Thelton Henderson, Federal District Court Judge, San Francisco
(Winter 1997-98)). Judge Henderson stated:
I’m opposed to mandatory minimums, in general, because I think they’re unduly harsh. I
think that they don’t allow the judge the discretion to deal with individual problems.
There is a formula that says you’ve been involved with a certain amount of drugs, for
example, ergo you get the mandatory minimum. And then they’re very harsh, and I’m
opposed to them.
Id.
73. See id.
74. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
75. See id.
76. See generally S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983).
77. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460-61 (1991).
78. See generally Jacob V. Lamar, Rolling Out the Big Guns; The First Couple and
Congress Press the Attack on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 22, 1986, at 25 (results of opinion poll on
seriousness of drug problem); Roger Rosenblatt, The Enemy Within; A Nation Wrestles with the
Dark and Dangerous Recesses of Its Soul, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 58 (outlining parameters of
civil war on drugs); Evan Thomas, America’s Crusade: What Is Behind the Latest War on Drugs,
TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 (looking into current drug policy and analyzing effects of some drugs
on the community).
79. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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traffickers were too often arrested, prosecuted, and convicted only to reappear
quickly on the streets.80
In response, two years following the Act of 1984, Congress enacted the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“Act of 1986”).81 The Act of 1986 materially
modified nearly every aspect of the federal sentencing of drugs.82 It expanded
the practice of linking drug quantity to sentencing.83 Under this Act, drug
offenders were punished based on the total quantity of drugs distributed not on
the pure amount of drugs involved.84
The purpose behind the Act of 1986 was to stop punishing drug traffickers
based on the purity of the substance, but instead based on the amount of the
substance drug traffickers were dealing.85 Congress based the mandatory
sentences on the weight of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of” the controlled substance in question.86 Congress also created a
violation for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 based on the number of plants attributable to the defendant.87
E.

The Omnibus Anti-Drug Act of 1988

As the drug problem in the United States continued to increase, Congress
responded by passing even more restrictive legislation.88 The result was the
Omnibus Anti-Drug Act of 1988 (“Act of 1988”),89 which further modified the
nation’s federal drug laws by enacting several new mandatory minimum
penalties.90 In the Act of 1988, Congress enacted the current congressional
penalty scheme for offenses involving marijuana plants.91 For the purpose of
mandatory minimum sentences, Congress in effect made one kilogram of
marijuana equivalent to a single marijuana plant.92 As originally promulgated,

80. See SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 9.
81. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, pt. 11-12, at 17 (1986), Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461
(classifying this approach as the “market-oriented approach”).
85. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461.
86. See id.
87. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). Before 1986,
the violation was only based on the weight of the marijuana. Id.
88. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 2D1.1(c). When an offense involves marijuana plants, the
Guidelines determine the appropriate base level according to the type and quantity of drug
concerned by an equivalency ratio of one marijuana plant being equal to 1000 grams of
marijuana. Id.
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the Guidelines treated one marijuana plant as equivalent to one kilogram
without regard to the number of plants involved.93 In response to Congress’
enactment, the Sentencing Commission also amended 21 U.S.C. § 841 to base
a sentence on the number of plants involved.94 In the Act of 1988, Congress
provided for mandatory minimum sentences of five years for 100 or more
plants and ten years for 1000 or more plants.95 However, Congress failed to
define “plant,” thus causing litigation about what constituted a marijuana plant
for sentencing purposes under 21 U.S.C. § 841.96
F.

How 21 U.S.C. § 841 Functions in Conjunction With the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984

The Guidelines explain that the statutorily authorized maximum sentence,
or a required minimum sentence, may effect the determination of a sentence
under the Guidelines.97 If the Guidelines indicate a sentencing range above the
maximum sentence set in a substantive criminal statute, then the statutorily
prescribed maximum sentence shall be the appropriate sentence.98 If the
93. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, at App. C. amend. 125.
94. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. In 1988, Congress substituted “containing a detectable
amount of marijuana, or 1,000 or more plants” for “containing a detectable amount of marijuana”
in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A)(vii). Id.
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 which provides:
Except as authorized provided . . . any person who violates [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)] shall be
sentenced as follows: (1)(A) In case of a violation of [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)] involving . . .
(vii) 1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants regardless of weight; . . .such person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than
life . . . . (1)(B) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving. . . .
(vii) 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, or 100 or more marijuana plants regardless of weight. . .or such person shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and not more
than 40 years.
Id.
96. See United States v. Fitch, 137 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1998).
97. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5G.1.1. The Guidelines states:
(a)
Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of
the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall
be the guideline sentence.
(b)
Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the
applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the
guideline sentence.
(c) In any other case, the sentence may be imposed at any point within the applicable
guideline range, provided that the sentence —
(1) is not greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence, and
(2) is not less than any statutorily required minimum sentence.
Id.
98. Id. § 5G.1.1 (a).
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Guidelines indicate a sentencing range below a mandatory minimum set by a
substantive criminal statute, then the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence
shall be the appropriate sentence.99 Finally, in any other case, the appropriate
sentence imposed may be within the Guidelines’ sentencing range as long as
the sentence is not less than the minimum statutorily prescribed sentence nor
greater than the maximum statutorily prescribed sentence.100
In application, if a drug offender is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and
the maximum sentence authorized is sixty months and the Guideline range is
sixty-three to seventy-eight months, then the sentence required is sixty
months.101 If the minimum mandatory sentence is ten years and the Guideline
range is sixty-three to seventy-eight months, then the appropriate sentence
would be ten years.102 If the Guideline range is sixty-three to seventy-eight
months and maximum statutory sentence is seventy-four months, then the
Guideline range is restricted to sixty-three to seventy-four months.103 Finally,
if the Guideline range is sixty-three to seventy-eight months and minimum
statutory sentence is seventy-four months, then the Guideline range is
restricted to seventy-four to seventy-eight months.104
III. THE MARIJUANA PLANT
A.

What is a Marijuana “Plant”

Cannabis sativa is commonly referred to by its Mexican colloquial name
“marijuana.”105 Widely considered the only species in the Cannabis genus,
marijuana is the mixture of dried, shredded flowers and leaves that comes from
the hemp plant.106 The narcotic effect of marijuana is a result of the
tetrahydrocannabinols (“THC”) in cannabis; the most psychoactive of which is
delta-9-THC.107 Hemp is an adaptable and versatile plant with its appearance

99. Id. § 5G.1.1 (b).
100. Id. § 5G.1.1 (c).
101. See generally U.S.S.G., supra note 3, § 5G.1.1 (a).
102. Id. § 5G.1.1 (b).
103. Id. § 5G.1.1 (c)(1).
104. Id. § 5G.1.1 (c)(2).
105. See Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1994.
106. See JAMES M. DEMPSEY, FIBER 54-55 (1975); R.H. KIRBY, VEGETABLE FIBERS 46
(1963).
107. See
Schlosser,
supra
note
105.
<http://www.theatlantic.com/election/connection/crime/reefm.htm.>.
“In various forms it
[marijuana] has long been familiar throughout the world: in Africa as ‘dagga’, in China ‘ma’, in
Northern Europe as ‘hemp’.” Id.
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depending upon the climate and cultivation techniques as well as the variety of
seed used.108
B.

Historical Background of the Marijuana

For thousands of years, hemp has been used on a global scale.109 Until the
late-nineteenth century, many believed hemp was the world’s most cultivated
crop and primary industry for nearly 3000 years.110 Although hemp most
likely originated in the steppes of central Asia, its cultivation spread
throughout Asia and India, and eventually, hemp reached Europe.111 By the
sixteenth century, Henry VIII of England required hemp be grown by the
English farmers to support the growing British navy and its continual need for
sails and rope.112 When British colonists came to the New World, they were
required to grow the plant to help fulfill Britain’s implacable need.113 In
America, the importance of hemp continued through the founding of the
United States. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, for example, used hemp

108. See David P. West, Fiber Wars: The Extinction of Kentucky Hemp, HEMP TODAY 5, 43
(Ed Rosenthal ed.) (1994). Id. See LESTER GRINSPOON, MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED 35 (1971).
When the hemp plant is grown in hot and/or dry climates, it tends to produce more resin, which is
the most potent part of the narcotic of the plant. In addition, when it is grown to produce
narcotics it is planted far apart, this encourages more leaves and flowers that produce the resin.
Id. See Kirby, supra note 106, at 50. Hemp is planted in the early spring, after the danger of
extended frosts has passed. In addition, hemp withstands most changes in the temperature,
making it suitable for growth in most areas. Id. See Dempsey, supra note 106, at 66. Once hemp
begins to grow, it requires very little care. Id
109. See JACK HERER, HEMP AND THE MARIJUANA CONSPIRACY: THE EMPEROR WEARS NO
CLOTHES 2 (7th ed. 1991). It may well have been the fiber used to make the first woven fabric.
Id.
110. See id. Hemp was used to make 90% of all ships’ sails, along with an estimated 80% of
all other textiles in the world, until the twentieth century. These textiles were used for everything
from sheets and towels to the tarpaulins used to create the covered wagons of American pioneers.
The original United States flag sewn by Betsy Ross is said to have been made of hemp fabric.
See id. at 5-6. For centuries, nearly all books were printed on hemp paper, including the
Gutenberg Bible. Other paper items such as currency, maps, and government documents were
printed on hemp paper as well. Hemp paper was often made from the rags of hemp fabric
resulting from worn-out sails, clothing, rope, and other items. See id. at 7.
111. See Kirby, supra note 106, at 46.
112. See Grinspoon, supra note 108, at 11.
113. See Herer, supra note 109, at 1. In 1619, the founders of the colony at Jamestown
ordered planting of the hemp seed. In 1631, in Massachusetts Bay Colony, other laws making the
cultivation of hemp mandatory were passed. In the following years, Connecticut and colonies
around the Chesapeake Bay passed such laws. In Virginia, a criminal penalty was imposed on
those who failed to grow hemp during the shortage. Id.
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as legal tender for exchange.114 In addition, many of the plantations in the
southern United States grew hemp.115
Throughout history, hemp was grown primarily for industrial uses,
although the narcotic strains were apparently used as a popular ingredient in
many medical products.116 During the nineteenth century, the use of marijuana
for recreation became a craze in France, and also, to some extent, in the United
States.117 However, it was not until the early twentieth century that marijuana
use became a focal point for public concern. In 1910, after the Mexican
Revolution, Mexican immigrants introduced the recreational use of marijuana
to the American culture.118 Consequently, the media campaigned to end the
use of marijuana in the United States via uniform state legislation.119
In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (“FBN”) was established.120
Harry Anslinger, who supported this campaign against marijuana, headed the
FBN.121 Concerned about the increase in the use of marijuana and research
linking marijuana usage to crime and other social problems, the FBN
encouraged all states to enact a law making marijuana illegal.122 Even with
powerful supporters, Anslinger was only partly successful in getting states to
pass uniform legislation.123 By 1931, marijuana had been outlawed in twentynine states.124
Nonetheless, the media’s condemning of marijuana paid off in 1937 when
Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (“Marihuana Tax Act”).125
The Marihuana Tax Act effectively criminalized marijuana, restricting
possession of the drug to individuals who paid an excise tax for certain medical
uses.126 The taxes essentially where imposed on producers, dispensers, and
users of marijuana.127
114. See
Marijuana
Timeline
(last
modified
August
22,
1999),
<http.www.pbs.org.wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html>.
115. See Herer, supra note 109, at 1. Records show that George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson both grew hemp. Id.
116. See Herer, supra note 109, at 9. In the early twentieth century, Cannabis appeared in the
U.S. Pharmacopoeia. Id.
117. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 114.
118. See id.; see also RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 32-52 (1974).
119. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 118, at 92-117; see also Grinspoon, supra note 108, at
323-25. Although in reality marijuana remained virtually unknown to most Americans. Id.
120. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 114.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) [hereinafter
Marihuana Tax Act].
126. See id.
127. Id. The Marihuana Tax Act:
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Witnesses from the Treasury Department and the FBN extensively assured
Congress that the Marihuana Tax Act would not affect hemp farmers.128 Hemp
farmers would automatically be allowed to continue to cultivate and profit
from the non-narcotic use of the plant.129 This protection for hemp farmers
rested in the Act’s definition of “marijuana”:
[A]ll parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds
thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or
resin- but shall not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from
such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such
mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the
sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.130

SEC. 2. (a) Every person who imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, deals
in, dispenses, prescribes, administers, or gives away marihuana shall (1) within fifteen
days after the effective date of this Act, or (2) before engaging after the expiration of such
fifteen-day period in any of the above mentioned activities, and (3) thereafter, on or
before July 1 of each year, pay the following special taxes respectively:
(1)
Importers, manufacturers, and compounders of marihuana, $24 per year.
(2)
Producers of marihuana (except those included within subdivision (4) of this
subsection), $1 per year, or fraction thereof, during which they engage in such
activity.
(3)
Physicians, dentists, veterinary surgeons, and other practitioners who
distribute, dispense, give away, administer, or prescribe marihuana to patients
upon whom they in the course of their professional practice are in attendance,
$1 per year or fraction thereof during which they engage in any of such
activities.
(4)
Any person not registered as an importer, manufacturer, producer, or
compounder who obtains and uses marihuana in a laboratory for the purpose of
research, instruction, or analysis, or who produces marihuana for any such
purpose, $1 per year, or fraction thereof, during which he engages in such
activities.
(5)
Any person who is not a physician, dentist, veterinary surgeon, or other
practitioner and who deals in, dispenses, or gives away marihuana, $3 per year:
Provided, That any person who has registered and paid the special tax as an
importer, manufacturer, compounder, or producer, as required by subdivisions
(1) and (2) of this subsection, may deal in, dispense, or give away marihuana
imported, manufactured, compounded, or produced by him without further
payment of the tax imposed by this section. . . .
Id.
128. See generally Taxation of Marihuana: Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before the Senate Comm.
On Finance, 75th Cong. 7 (1937).
129. See Marihuana Tax Act. However, hemp farmers had to pay a small fee to the Treasury
Department. Id.
130. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 802(16).
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Despite the purported intention of the Act’s drafters, the Marihuana Tax Act
contributed to the death of the hemp industry.131
Throughout the early twentieth century, the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) had supported hemp cultivation.132 During World War II,
there was a need for hemp and other materials critical to producing cordage,
parachutes, and other military necessities.133 In response, the USDA launched
its “Hemp for Victory” program.134 The program encouraged farmers to plant
hemp by granting deferments to those who would remain home in order to
grow hemp and supply the seeds.135 By 1943, the program had harvested
375,000 acres of hemp.136
In the 1960s, “[a] changing political and cultural climate was reflected in
more lenient attitudes towards marijuana.”137 The use of marijuana became
popular among the white upper-middle class.138 In 1961, only a few years after
the final demise of the hemp industry in the United States, Congress ratified
the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and defined
marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic, the most heavily controlled category of
drugs. 139 From 1980 to present, there has been a “war on drugs.”140
Currently, marijuana is illegal in all fifty states.141
IV. CASE LAW
A.

The Majority View

The majority’s view is that a marijuana stalk, representing remains of a
harvested marijuana plant, is a “plant” within the meaning of the statute.142 In
United States v. Fitch, the most recent interpretation on what constitutes a
marijuana “plant” for sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841, was decided.143 The
131. See West, supra note 108, at 30.
132. Id. at 16, 20.
133. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 114.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 114.
139. See generally Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1408, 520
U.N.T.S. 204.
140. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 114.
141. See id. Some states have enacted statutes allowing the use of marijuana for medical
purposes. In 1996, “California voters passed Proposition 215 allowing for the sale and medical
use of marijuana for patients with AIDS, cancer, and other serious and painful diseases.”
However, these state laws are in conflict with current federal prohibition laws dealing with
marijuana such as 21 U.S.C. § 841. Id.
142. See id.
143. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 283.
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court held that the plant was only required to be alive at some point during the
commission of the offense.144
1.

The Facts and Procedural History of Fitch

In August of 1993, the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics Eradication Unit,
after being informed of the defendant’s marijuana farm, flew over the
defendant’s farm in a helicopter.145 The bureau found seventy-two marijuana
plants, upon which the Bureau destroyed.146 Three months later, a search
warrant for the defendant’s entire farm was obtained and executed by the local
law enforcement.147 The local law enforcement “found approximately twenty
kilograms of processed marijuana in individual zip lock plastic “baggies,” or in
cans.”148 Furthermore, 288 marijuana stalks were found that had been fully
stripped of all leaves, leaving only dry husks.149
Later, in July of 1996, a random fly-over search revealed marijuana again
growing on the defendant’s farm.150 This triggered, the states law enforcement
to obtain a search warrant.151 The search led to the seizure of 827 marijuana
plants in pre-harvest condition.152
In 1996, the defendant was charged and convicted of knowingly
manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute
marijuana.153 The defendant’s offense involved 1187 marijuana plants.154 The
court attributed more than 1000 plants to the defendant, therefore, he was
sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841 to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years imprisonment.155
The defendant appealed, relying on the minority position’s definition of
“plant” as interpreted by the courts in the United States v. Stevens and United
144. Id. at 282.
145. Id. at 279.
146. Id.
147. Fitch, 137 F. 3d at 279.
148. Id. at 279. Also found were “large amounts of marijuana residue throughout the area”
and “evidence of a marijuana growing operation.” Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 280.
151. Id.
152. Fitch, 137 F. 3d at 280. Essentially, the 827 plants were alive and growing at the time of
seizure. Id.
153. Id. at 280. The defendant was charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). Id.
154. Id. at 278. The 1187 plants attributed to the defendant are the number of plants found at
the farm during the three seizures of the defendant’s farm. Id.
155. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) provides:
1000 kilograms of more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
marijuana, or 1,000 or more marijuana plants regardless of weight. . . .
[S]uch person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10
years or more than life. . . .No person sentenced under this subparagraph shall be eligible
for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed therein.
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States v. Blume.156 The minority position is that the remains of a harvested
marijuana plant is not a “plant” within the meaning of the 21 U.S.C. § 841.157
Thus, the plant must be alive at the time of seizure.158 In Fitch, the defendant
argued that the 288 marijuana plants should not have been counted against him
because they were stalks, not plants.159 The defendant stated that the term
“plant” means a plant that is alive at the time of the seizure; thus, a stalk is not
a “plant” because a stalk is not alive.160
2.

The Court’s Holding And Reasoning

In Fitch, the court disregarded the fact that 288 of the marijuana plants had
been harvested before their discovery. It stated that the fact that the plants
were not alive at the time of seizure did not affect their status as marijuana
plants for applying the mandatory minimum sentence required by 21 U.S.C. §
841.161 The court based its holding on several factors: the plain language of
the statute,162 the legislative intent,163 and the notion that the defendant was
seeking to add an additional evidentiary requirement to the statute.164 The court
found that the plant was only required to be alive at some point during the
commission of the offense.165 In Fitch, the marijuana stalk was alive before
the defendant harvested it; thus, it constituted a marijuana plant.
a.

The Plain Language

In Fitch, the court found the plain language of the statute indicates that the
only requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 is that the offense involve 1000 or more
plants.166 In the statute’s text, nothing suggests that the application of the
156. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 281; see also Stevens, 25 F.3d at 318; Blume, 967 F.2d at 45.
157. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 281.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 279.
160. See id. at 281. Using the defendant’s definition, the plant must be unharvested at the
time of the seizure. Therefore, a stalk would not fit into the meaning of “plants” for sentencing
purposes under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Id.
161. See id. at 282-83; see United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996)
(stating that all the government must prove is that at some point in time the defendant possessed
marijuana plants with the intent to distribute in order to obtain a sentence under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(vii)).
162. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
165. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282; see also United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding a marijuana plant can be a plant even if it is not alive).
166. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282. The court stated:
The statute § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), states that any defendant convicted of an offense under
this subsection involving “1,000 or more marijuana plants” shall be subject to a ten year
mandatory minimum sentence regardless of the weight of the marijuana produced. Thus,
under the plain language of the statute, the only requirement which must be met in order
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statute depend upon whether at the time of the seizure marijuana plants are
harvested or unharvested.167 The court stated the term “offense involving
marijuana plants” means only the cultivation and harvesting of marijuana
plants and the processing of plants into consumable products is required.168
The defendant’s argument that the plant must be alive at the time of seizure
cannot be inferred from the text of 21 U.S.C. § 841.169 Nor does any authority
exist within the plain language of the statute for creating such a requirement.170
b.

The Legislative Intent

In Fitch, the court found nothing in the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. §
841 that supported the defendant’s position.171 The court stated “Congress did
not distinguish between harvested and unharvested, live or dead plants. . . .”172
Furthermore, the court stated that there was no evidence to the contrary that
Congress intended to define “plant” in any other way than by its ordinary and
plain dictionary meaning.173
c.

The Addition of An Extra Evidentiary Element

In Fitch, the court found the defendant sought
evidentiary requirement to the statute by claiming that
be alive at the time of seizure to be counted as
purposes.174 The court stated that the statute itself

to add an additional
marijuana plants must
plants for sentencing
does not contain the

to trigger the applicable mandatory sentence is that the offense involve 1,000 or more
marijuana plants.
Id.
167. See id.; see also United States v. Shields, 87 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
the similar argument that for sentencing purposes only seized alive plants can be considered);
United States v. Fitol, 733 F.Supp. 1312, 1316 (D.Minn 1990). The court stated, “[t]here is no
distinction made in the statute [§ 841] between seedlings, cuttings, small plants, medium plants,
large plants, mother plants, plants with secondary root and leaf stem, etc. These groupings are all
subcategories of plants[,] plants at various stages of growth, but plants nonetheless.” Id.
168. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282; see also United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to all offenses involving the growing of marijuana);
United States v. Haynes, 969 F.2d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the offense encompassed
only growing of the marijuana plants).
169. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282; see Shields, 87 F.3d at 1197 (“Nothing in the text of. . .§841(b)
suggests that their application depends upon whether the marijuana plants are harvested before or
after authorities apprehend the grower.”).
170. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282.
171. Id.; see Fletcher, 74 F.3d at 55 (“. . .Congress has not further subdivided live marijuana
plants into growing plants and cut plants.”).
172. 137 F.3d at 282.
173. Id.; see United States v. Eves, 932 F.2d 856, 860 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding there was not
“. . .any aspect of legislative history that supports [the] theory that Congress intended “plant” to
be construed other than by its plain and ordinary dictionary meaning”).
174. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282.
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requirement set out by the defendant, and to accept the defendant’s
construction would in effect require rewriting the statute.175 In order to obtain
a sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the court held the government is only
required to prove that the defendant possessed with the intent to distribute or
distributed marijuana plants at some duration during the offense.176 Thus, the
statute only requires evidence that 1000 marijuana plants are attributable to the
defendant during the offense. The statute does not require the plants be alive at
the time of seizure.177
B.

The Minority View

The minority’s view is that only live marijuana plants should be counted in
the number of plants, while dry or post-harvested plants should be calculated
for sentencing purposes by actual weight of marijuana they produced.178 The
court in Blume held that a marijuana plant must be in plant form at time of
seizure.179 In Stevens, the court held that a plant is not a plant unless it is
alive.180
1.

The Facts of Stevens

In September of 1992, agents obtained and executed search warrants at the
defendant’s home and cabin. Between the home and the cabin, the agents
seized 756.88 grams of marijuana, a thermos with marijuana residue, and a
notebook containing names and dollar amounts.181 During the defendant’s
grand jury indictment, a witness testified that he began providing the defendant
with marijuana in 1988.182
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Silvers, 84 F.3d at 1327.
177. See Silvers, 84 F.3d at 1327 (relying on United States v. Wegner, 46 F.3d 924, 928 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
178. See Stevens, 25 F.3d at 323; Blume, 967 F.2d at 49.
179. Blume, 967 F.2d at 51. The court noted that:
[T]he intent of the guidelines was “to measure live marijuana by the number of plants and
dry leaf marijuana by weight.” We believe this approach best comports with
congressional intent in passing its mandatory sentencing provision, 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(vii), and with the rationale for the corresponding sentencing guideline. . .
Id.
180. See Stevens, 25 F.3d at 323.
181. Id. at 320. Other objects found were not relevant to the defendant being charged under
21 U.S.C. § 841.
182. Id. The court stated:
Through an intermediary that year, he provided [the defendant] with about five pounds of
marijuana from 50 plants. He then met, [the defendant] for the first time in 1989, and [the
defendant] indicated he would take whatever [the witness] grew that year. [The witness]
supplied [the defendant] with approximately 10 pounds from 100 plants. [The witness’s]
testimony is unclear as to how much marijuana he supplied [the defendant] with in 1990.
In 1991, he grew between 700 and 1000 plants resulting in 20 to 30 pounds of marijuana.
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Overall, he provided the defendant with approximately 1600 plants worth
of marijuana.183 After the indictment, the defendant entered a plea admitting to
participating in a marijuana conspiracy. At sentencing, the defendant was
sentenced outside the perimeters of his plea agreement.184 Consequently, the
defendant appealed to the sixth circuit to re-evaluate his sentence.185
2.

The Court’s Holding and Reasoning

In Stevens, the court held the defendant was wrongly sentenced upon the
number of plants his supplier grew, rather than upon the weight of marijuana
that the defendant conspired to possess.186 The court held that 21 U.S.C. § 841
only applies to the number of marijuana plants that are found alive. The court
based its decision solely on legislative intent of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the
Guidelines.187 It looked at the amendments made to both the Guidelines and
21 U.S.C. § 841 and their legislative intent. 188 The court stated that for
marijuana that has been harvested, punishment is provided for in the
Guidelines based upon the actual weight.189 The court concluded that under
the initial editions of the Guidelines, harvested marijuana was to be measured
by weight, not by the number of plants that the marijuana came from. The
court emphasized that neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has
ever repudiated this proposition. Accordingly, the court held the proper way to
calculate the quantity of marijuana for sentencing is to apply the provision only
to live marijuana plants seized.190
Before planting in 1992, [the defendant] told [the witness] he wanted 100 pounds of
marijuana, and [the witness] said he grew about 1000 plants that year, though not all were
harvested, as police broke up the conspiracy.
Id.
183. Id. The court stated:
[I]n determining how much marijuana to attribute to [the defendant], the court added up
the number of plants [the witness] grew, ignoring 1990 in which the court found [the
witness’s] testimony unclear. Each plant was assumed to weigh one kilogram. The court
stated that [the witness] grew 50 plants in 1988, 100 in 1989, and, based upon the lowest
estimates from 1991 and 1992, 700 and 750 plants in those years respectively. Thus, there
alone we have 1600 plants over the course of this conspiratorial relationship.
Id.
184. Id.
185. See Stevens, 25 F.3d at 319.
186. Id. at 323.
187. Id. at 322-23. See also supra notes 53-56, 65 and accompanying text.
188. Stevens, 25 F.3d at 322-23.
189. Id. at 322.
190. Id. at 322-23. The court stated:
The important point emerging from this history is that under the initial editions of the
Guidelines, harvested marijuana was to be measured by weight, not by the number of
plants that the marijuana came from, and neither Congress nor the Sentencing
Commission has ever repudiated this proposition. The equivalency provision was
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
When interpreting a statute, one must look to the plain language of the text.
When the plain language is unambiguous, a court generally will give effect to
the plain and ordinary meaning, unless, there is legislative intent to the
contrary.191 The policy implication of the possible interpretations of the statute
must also be considered. One should first look to the words of the statute, but
“not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or objective to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to the meaning.”192
A.

The Plain Language of 21 U.S.C. § 841

There are customary ways to interpret a statute called the “Canons of
Construction.”193 Most importantly, the “Canons” state that ordinary terms
shall be construed by their ordinary meaning and when the same language is
used in various parts of the act, the language is presumed the same
throughout.194 The first issue is the definition of a marijuana “plant.”
Throughout the history of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the SRA, there have been
many different definitions of “plant.” However, a stalk is not included in any
of the definitions of “plant.” The common everyday meaning of “plant” is a
living organism, which belongs to the vegetable kingdom in the broadest
sense.195 According to Webster’s Dictionary a “plant” is “a young tree, a
shrub, or herb, planted or ready to plant; a slip, cutting, or sapling. . . .”196
In 1994, one court defined a plant by its characteristics stating,
“[m]arijuana plants have three characteristic structures, readily apparent to the
unaided layperson’s eye: root, stems, and leaves.”197 In 1995, the Sentencing
Commission added a note to the Guidelines stating that for the purpose of the
Guidelines, a plant “is an organism having leaves and a readily observable root

developed to apply in sentencing when the plants have not been harvested. The proper
way to calculate the quantity of marijuana for sentencing here, then, is to apply the
provision only to live marijuana plants found. Additional amounts for dry leaf marijuana
that a defendant possesses—or marijuana sales that constitute “relevant conduct” that has
occurred in the past—are to be added based upon the actual weight of the marijuana and
not based upon the number of plants from which the marijuana was derived.
Id.
191. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-62.
192. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
193. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
194. Id. at 403.
195. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1881, def. no. 3 (2d ed.
unabridged 1961).
196. See Eves, 932 F.2d at 859.
197. See United States v. Robinson, 35 F.3d 442, 446 (9th Cir. 1994).
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formation.”198 The Sentencing Commission explained the amendment stating
that it addresses the issue of what constitutes a marijuana plant because several
circuits have addressed the issue of when a cutting from a marijuana plant
becomes a plant.199 The Guidelines’ amendment defines “plant” for guidance
purposes; however, the Guidelines’ definition mentions nothing of whether a
stalk is a plant.200 Though it can be inferred that the Guidelines’ definition
does not include a stalk as a plant because stalk does not have “readily
observable root formation.”
The most sensible definition for “plant” is found within the same title as 21
U.S.C. § 841. In 21 U.S.C. § 802, a marijuana plant is defined as follows:
[A]ll parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds
thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber
produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any
other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such
mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the
sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.201

Since, the preceding definition also does not include a stalk, it can be inferred
that Congress did not intend to include a stalk in the definition “plant” for the
purposes of sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841.202
B.

Legislative Intent of 21 U.S.C. § 841

Before 1986, sentences for possession with the intent to distribute
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 were based on the weight of the
marijuana seized.203 In the Act of 1986, Congress, for the first time, based
sentencing on the number of plants attributable to the defendant.204 However,
no House or Senate Report was submitted with this legislation.205 In addition,
the discussion of the statute reported in the Congressional Record sheds no
light on Congress’ intent.206

198. See U.S.G.G., supra note 3, § 2D1.1(c), cmt. 18. The comment was added as a response
to all the litigation of what constitutes a “plant.” It became effective on November 1, 1995. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (16). See also Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, Pub. L. No. 75-238,
50 Stat. 551 (1937). The definition from the Marihuana Tax Act is the same as the definition
Congress adopted in Title 21.
202. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
203. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); see supra
notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Silvers, 84 F.3d at 1322.
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Congress enacted the amendments changing relevant sections of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) into their present form as part of the Act of 1988.207 Once more, no
House or Senate Reports were submitted with the amendments.208 The only
relevant discussion of either part of the statute was a section-by-section
analysis read into the Congressional Record by Senator Biden.209 Nothing in
Senator Biden’s discussion can be interpreted as an expression of Congress’
intent to require a plant to be alive at the time of seizure.210 Nor does it give
any insight on what the definition of plant should be.211
Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history of the 1988
amendment why this method was used instead of simply stating whether stalks
were to be included in determining the amount of plants. Nor has any
legislative material been found that sheds any light on what motivated the 1986
change employing the number of plants involved in the determining sentences
or what is meant by “plants” in either amendment.212
Despite the lack of legislative history, many courts have inferred that the
purpose of the statute is to punish marijuana growers more severely than other
defendants. This line of cases began with United States v. Fitol in which the
district court stated:
It seems clear . . . that by changing the determining factor from weight to
number of “plants regardless of weight,” Congress intended to punish growers

207. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); see supra
notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
208. See id.
209. See 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden).
Senator Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, regarding § 6479 stated:
Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides for a mandatory minimum 10 year penalty for distribution,
or possession with intent to distribute, of “1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana.” Defendants charged with
possessing large quantities of marijuana plants have argued that the statutory definition of
marijuana specifically excludes the seeds and stems of the plant, and that therefore these
items may not be counted toward the 1,000 kilogram requirement.
The government has argued in response that the term “mixture or substance” encompasses
all parts of the plants as harvested, notwithstanding the statutory definition of
“marijuana,” but defendants contend that the “mixture or substance” language applies
only to marijuana after it has been prepared for illegal distribution. The defendants’
position has been adopted by at least one court.
The amendment is intended to curtail this unnecessary debate by providing that the
minimum penalty is triggered either by the weight of the “mixture or substance” or by the
number of plants regardless of weight. The bill uses 1,000 plants as the equivalent of
1,000 kilograms.
Id.
210. See generally 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also
Silvers, 84 F.3d at 1322.
211. Id.
212. See Silvers, 84 F.3d at 1321-22.
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of marihuana by the scale or potential of their operation and not just by the
weight of the plants seized at a given moment. Congress must have found a
defendant who is growing 100 newly planted marihuana plants to be as
culpable as one who has successfully grown 100 kilograms of marijuana.213

The Fitol interpretation of Congress’ intent has gained a wide following.214 If
the intent was to punish growers more harshly than other defendants, then a
new question arises under the majority approach: whether the Government
must prove that the defendant was the grower.
However, the history surrounding the enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 841
suggests that Congress had a broader purpose in enacting the statute.215 Since
the marijuana industry is like any other agricultural business and drug crimes
have been on the rise, it appears that Congress intended to punish the
marijuana industry as a whole.216 The people involved in it have the same
basic roles as their counterparts in the legitimate agricultural trade.217 Within
the trade some people plant the seeds, some tend to the plants, some harvest
the plant’s, some dry the plants, some cut and package them, and some
distribute them to the wholesale and retail markets. Accordingly, the purpose
of 21 U.S.C. § 841 appears to be to punish more harshly people involved in
production regardless of whether they are the grower, the harvester, or the
dryer.

213. Fitol, 733 F. Supp at 1315.
214. See Fletcher, 74 F.3d at 55 (“By providing that processed marijuana be measured by
weight but live plants be counted by number and then treated as the equivalent of an amount of
dry marijuana as set by statute, Congress has established a system of stepped-up punishment for
growers.”); Wegner, 46 F.3d at 926 (“Our precedent unambiguously endorses the view that the
one kilogram conversion ratio represents congressional intent to punish growers of 50 or more
marijuana plants to a greater extent than smaller producers or mere possessors.”); United States v.
Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995) (21 U.S.C. § 841(b) “punishes marijuana growers by
relying in sentencing on the number of live plants recovered rather than marijuana weight”);
United States v. Jackson, 11 F.3d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Congress intended to punish
growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their operation and not just by the weight of the
plants seized at a given moment.”); United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 802 (10th Cir.
1993) (“[W]e rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the minimum sentencing provisions
found at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(vii), holding that Congress rationally ‘intended to punish
growers of marijuana by the scale or potential of their operation and not just the weight of the
plants seized at a given moment’.”); United States v. Smith, 961 F.2d 1389, 1390 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“The cases suggest Congress intended to account for the heightened culpability of growers
because of their primacy in the distribution chain, rather than to punish them based on predictable
yield of their plants.”).
215. See supra notes 37-97 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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C. Policy
Currently, the United States is in a “war on drugs.”218 Along with
interdiction, education, and testing, reform of the national drug laws has
become one of the major weapons of the “war on drugs.” It is estimated that
over $300 billion is spent annually on the drug problem.219 Society believes
that drug abuse is one of the single most important problems facing our
country.220 Society feels that harsher punishment and cutting the drug supply
is the most important thing that can be done to help reduce drug crime.221
Overall, society feels the country is spending too little in dealing with drug
crimes.222
In 1997, 38.7% of all the sentencing guideline cases were drug offenses.
The largest percentages of those offenses were cases involving marijuana.223
Of the 27,000 drug offenders sentenced to probation in seventeen states in
1986, 49% were rearrested for a felony offense within three years in which
26.7% were drug related.224 In response to the obvious economic and social
problems created by illegal use of drugs, in order to fight the “war on drugs”
Congress needs to reload its weapons by including harsher measures for drug
offenders.225

218. See Katherine Bishop, Mandatory Sentences in Drug Cases: Is the Law Defeating Its
Purpose?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1990, at B16 (quoting Judge David Williams, Federal District
Judge in Los Angeles, California). Judge Williams stated, “We are in a war on drugs and it does
require harsh action. It deals harshly with a lot of people, but it may get some out of business.”
Id.; see also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
219. See Naftali Bendavid, Is Drug Czar Destined for Siberia?: Clinton Slow to Focus on
Leadership, Fate of Troubled Office, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at 1, 20.
220. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 32 (1993). A
recent Gallup Poll reported that in 1994 nine percent of the people surveyed said drug abuse was
the single most important problem facing the country. In 1985, two percent of respondents felt
this way. Id.
221. Id. In a 1989 Gallup Poll, a question was “What is the most important thing that can be
done to help reduce crime?” Twenty-four percent responded “harsher punishment” and twentyfive percent responded “cutting the drug supply.” Id.
222. Id. In a National Opinion Research Center Poll, sixty percent of the respondents, when
asked about the spending for various social problems, said the country is spending too little in
dealing with drug crimes. Id.
223. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 1997 DATAFILE OPAF (1997). More than
twenty-five percent of the 38.7% were marijuana-related cases. Id.
224. STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 26. Thus, one out
of three were rearrested for drug offenses. Id.
225. Id. at 27. Eighty-three percent of the people surveyed said marijuana was easy to obtain.
Id.
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D. Case Analysis
1.

The Author’s Analysis of the Majority Position

In Fitch, the court did not actually analyze the question of what constitutes
a “plant.” The analysis of the court never discusses the meaning of term
“plant.” Essentially, all the court states is that the term “plant” is to be defined
by its ordinary and common meaning since there is no evidence to the
contrary.226 Instead, the court interpreted the statute to mean that at some point
during the commission of the offense, the stalk must have been a plant.227 The
court inferred this from the plain language of the text.228 The court found that
the text of the statute did not state whether the plant had to be harvested at the
time of seizure.229 Furthermore, the legislative history revealed nothing of a
requirement that the plant had to be alive at the time of seizure.230 The court
concluded that the defendant was trying to add an extra requirement that is not
supported by legislative intent or by the plain language of the statute.231
Accordingly, the court held that a plant does not have to be alive at the time of
the seizure.232
The statute states “any person who violates subsection (a) of this section
shall be sentenced as follows: In a case of a violation of subsection (a) of this
section involving. . . .”233 Then, § 841 lists different types and quantities of
controlled substances. Subsection (a) of 21 U.S.C. § 841 reads, it shall be
unlawful “to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. . . .”234 In the
reading of the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 841, it could be inferred that
sentencing should occur under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for an offense as described in
subsection (a) involving any of the enumerated categories.235 Here, the
enumerated quantity and type of drug at issue is 1000 marijuana plants.236 The
court rationalized that since a stalk at one point in time had to be a marijuana
plant, it counts as a plant under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for the purposes of
sentencing.237 However, how far will the courts take the interpretation of “the
offense involves?” Will a person who intends to manufacture marijuana plants
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
Fitch, 137 F.3d. at 282-83.
See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 171-72 accompanying text.
See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a).
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 841.
Id.
Fitch, 137 F.3d at 282-83.
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be sentenced to ten years if he is found with 1000 marijuana seeds? How
about if a person is found with processed marijuana attributable to 1000
marijuana plants? Thus, under the majority approach another problem arises:
What does the term “the offense involves” means?238
On the other hand, the consequence of adopting the majority’s position
does collaborate with the society’s view in taking a harsher stance on drug
crimes.239 By encompassing more drug offenders under the mandatory
minimum of ten years, the majority is essentially taking a tough stance on drug
crimes, which is needed in America due to the alarming number of people who
use illegal drugs.240 Furthermore, such a tough stance is needed due to the
increase in drug use among America’s youth.241 The majority’s approach
would be a more effective weapon and aid in the “war on drugs.”
3.

The Author’s Analysis of the Minority Position

The minority’s approach is unlike the majority’s approach, which states the
legislative history revealed nothing about the plant being alive at the time of
seizure; thus, it must not be a requirement.242 The minority stated that 21
U.S.C. § 841 and the Guidelines as originally promulgated punished harvested
marijuana by its actual weight.243 The court emphasized that though a
punishment has been added based on the number of marijuana plants, neither
Congress nor the Sentencing Commission has said anything that contradicted
the original idea of harvested plants being measured by weight.244
Accordingly, the court stated since the legislative history reveals nothing about
the change, Congress meant it to remain as originally promulgated.245 Under
the minority’s approach, a stalk is a harvested marijuana plant and measured
by its weight for sentencing purposes.246 The minority does not discuss the

238. See supra notes 213-27 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 218-25.
240. See STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 30. In a 1993
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration survey, seventy-seven million Americans,
thirty-seven percent of the population, claimed they had used drugs at least once in their lifetime.
Twelve percent said they had used drugs within the last twelve months. Id.
241. See STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 27. In a 1993
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration survey, twenty-six percent of high school
students reported using drugs within the last year, which is a 4.1% increase from the prior year.
In addition, 15.5% of high school students said they had used drugs within the last month, which
is 2.6% increase from the prior year. Id.
242. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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plain language of the text the minority only stated that the term “plant” should
be interpreted by its common meaning thus, a stalk is not a plant.247
The consequence of adopting the minority’s approach is that it imposes
lenient sentences upon drug offenders. Under the minority’s approach, the
sentence of the defendant in Fitch would be a maximum of six and a half
years248 and a minimum of five years and three months.249 However, under the
majority’s approach, the sentence of the defendant in Fitch would be a
minimum of ten years.250 Consequently, the minority’s approach contradicts
the goals of the society in cutting the drug supply and imposing harsher
penalties to win the “war on drugs.”251 The minority’s approach provides for a
lighter penalty for drug offenders, which is less of a deterrent to potential
offenders.252 Furthermore, the minority’s narrow reading of 21 U.S.C. § 841
causes the early release of drug offenders, thus placing them back into the
community to commit yet another crime.253
VI. SUGGESTED SOLUTION
It is a goal of the Congress and the Sentencing Commission to have
uniformity in sentencing.254 This goal is not achieved due to the different
interpretations of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The minority’s approach imposes a
substantially lesser sentence on the violators of 21 U.S.C. § 841 than the
majority’s approach, which completely contradicts the current policy
surrounding drug offenders.255 Furthermore, the statute was developed to be
tough on drug crimes and to punish the producers of marijuana harsher than
other defendants.256 The minority’s interpretation is not fulfilling the purpose
of the statute.257 On the other hand, the majority’s approach leads to additional
21 U.S.C. § 841 interpretational problems surrounding the term “the offense

247. See id.
248. Fitch, 137 F.3d at 281. Six and one-half years is assuming that the 288 stalks in Fitch
were not counted as plants, thus the defendant was sentenced under the Guidelines where the
maximum range was 78 months, hence, six and one-half years.
249. Id. Five years and three months is assuming that the 288 stalks in Fitch were not
counted as plants, thus the defendant was sentenced under the Guidelines where the minimum
range was 63 months, hence, five years and three months.
250. Id. Ten years is assuming that the 288 stalks in Fitch were counted as plants, thus the
defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841 where the minimum sentence is ten years.
251. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 215-25, 242-53 and accompanying text.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
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involves” which could be interpreted in a number of different ways causing
further sentencing disparity.258
In order to eliminate sentencing disparity, Congress must amend the
statute. In the amendment, Congress should adopt the majority’s approach in
order to more effectively fight the “war on drugs” before the “war” is lost.
Furthermore, Congress must explain that it is not relevant whether the plant is
alive at the time of seizure, or if the plant is actually seizured. Therefore, all
that must be proven is that “the offense involves” marijuana plants. Congress
must further explain what is included under “the offense involves,” so that the
courts will have uniform guidance in applying 21 U.S.C. § 841, thus reducing
the chance for sentencing disparity. If Congress amends the statute as
suggested, it will take the disparity out of sentencing and will be a starting
point in winning the “war on drugs.”
VII. CONCLUSION
The sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s came out of the
concern that a defendant’s actual time served was often not commensurate with
his acts or equivalent to other defendants who committed the same crime.259
At the same time, Congress sought to address the growing drug problem in
America by harshly punishing drug offenders. However, Congress failed to
give the courts any guidance in how the achieve these, at times, conflicting
goals. Whether it was an intentional omission or an ill-considered oversight
amidst massive legislation and a tremendously complex sentencing schedule,
both Congress and the Sentencing Commission failed to explain how 21
U.S.C. § 841 should be applied. A combination of inaction and ambiguous
drafting has failed to resolve the continuing problems of the interpretation of
21 U.S.C. § 841. Furthermore, Congress has remained silent on the issue, thus,
leaving the door open to disparity in sentencing. Ultimately Congress needs to
remedy the current situation by adopting the majority’s approach and by
explaining what is meant by the term “the offense involves.”260
KRISTIN J. BALDING*

258. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
259. See discussion supra Part II.
260. See discussion supra Part VI.
*
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